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Introduction
Recent research in law and corporate finance
suggests that existing bankruptcy rules have
evolved to eliminate inefficiencies that result
when lenders rush to retrieve their assets from
a firm in financial distress. In contrast, first-
come, first-served (FCFS) rules, often consid-
ered a benchmark in the absence of other
bankruptcy rules, are commonly thought to be
inefficient because they reduce the value of the
defaulting firm’s assets. This, however, may not
always be the case. Moral hazard problems
associated with the choice of project may make
the act of running on a firm desirable, since it
can help align investment incentives.
This paper looks at the problem of an entre-
preneur who must raise outside funds to fi-
nance one of two investment alternatives. One
of them is risky, and the bankruptcy costs ex-
pected to result from this project make it less
desirable socially than the alternative, riskless
project. Nevertheless, the firm is unable to com-
mit to the less risky enterprise.
FCFS rules act to diminish this moral hazard
problem. I derive a mixed-strategy equilibrium
in which lenders monitor the firm with some
positive probability. When the firm is caught
investing in the risky project, it is liquidated;
otherwise, it is allowed to continue. Although
this mixed-strategy equilibrium may exist under
both a FCFS rule and a proportionate priority
rule (PPR), I demonstrate that it is less likely to
exist under the PPR, and that when it does, the
FCFS equilibrium is Pareto superior.
The fact that lenders can run on the firm
when they observe that it has chosen the risky
project helps keep the firm honest. The FCFS
aspect of asset distribution keeps lenders from
wanting to free ride on the monitoring efforts of
others because the lenders who monitor are first
in line to receive their claim on the firm’s assets
and are thus likely to be paid in full. Lenders
who wait to observe the monitoring of others
are less likely to receive anything if the firm
goes under. This process is similar to that de-
scribed in Calomiris and Kahn (1991), where
demandable debt is used to control the banker’s
moral hazard problem, while sequential service
prevents depositors from free riding on the
monitoring efforts of others.
The key idea here is that bankruptcy institu-
tions should reward monitors when and only
when they have performed their duties. A simi-
lar argument has been made by Rajan and
Winton (1995), who analyze how the choice of
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different priority and term structures in loan
contracts affects lenders’ incentives to monitor
the firm. They argue that information condi-
tions determine which structures provide the
best monitoring incentives, meaning that the
firm’s capital structure can be used to achieve
outcomes that are not directly contractible. In
other words, ex ante efficiency is improved by
choosing a capital structure that properly re-
wards monitors. This paper differs from Rajan
and Winton, however, in that it focuses directly
on the structure of the bankruptcy institution,
outside of which private agents are not al-
lowed to contract by law. 
Although FCFS rules are beneficial in my
model, there are other factors I have ignored
that work in the opposite direction. Longhofer
and Peters (1997) examine the coordination
problem discussed above and show how lend-
ers might fail to coordinate their liquidation
decisions, even when doing so would be a
Pareto-superior outcome. As a result, mandatory
bankruptcy procedures (which implicitly en-
force a PPR) can be socially desirable, since
they enable lenders to coordinate in states of the
world where they would not otherwise do so.
In many respects, the work of Longhofer and
Peters represents the opposite side of this analy-
sis. Notably, their paper assumes that FCFS rules
entail a deadweight social cost, while ignoring
the potential impact of such rules on a lender’s
monitoring incentives. This paper does exactly
the opposite, focusing on how FCFS rules can
ameliorate the firm’s moral hazard problem. A
more complete model would attempt to capture
both effects of a FCFS rule: the benefits associ-
ated with improved monitoring incentives and
the costs associated with inefficient default.
The next section summarizes traditional
bankruptcy analyses. Here, I outline some of
the standard arguments in favor of an alterna-
tive to a FCFS rule in bankruptcy law and ques-
tion whether they are valid in all circumstances.
I then use this background to analyze other
studies of bankruptcy. I introduce my model in
section II and show that under certain condi-
tions, a firm may be unable to obtain financing
because it cannot commit ex ante to a low-risk
project; possible solutions to this problem are
analyzed. In particular, I show that there exists
a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the firm
is able to find lenders. Section III looks at the
effect different bankruptcy rules may have on
the equilibrium of this game. I show that a PPR
reduces lenders’ incentives to monitor the firm,
thus raising the social cost of these contracts. 




Most discussions of bankruptcy institutions start
with the assumption that a formal procedure is
needed for distributing an insolvent firm’s as-
sets, and then focus on the specific form such a
procedure should take. It is not clear, however,
that this assumption is valid in all cases. To see
this, consider some of its standard justifications.
In the absence of bankruptcy laws, assets
are distributed to creditors in the order in
which they have staked their claims. Thus, 
the first lender to request repayment is gener-
ally the first to receive it. Lenders who end 
up last in line are paid last and quite possibly
receive nothing.1  For this reason, these default
bankruptcy proceedings are typically called
FCFS rules.
Traditional rationales for a more orderly
mechanism cite several potential problems with
FCFS rules. First, lenders may wish to protect
their position by expending excessive resources
to monitor the firm’s condition. If a lender does
not do this, the argument goes, he will certainly
be the last to know when the firm is about to
default, and consequently be the last in line to
collect his claim. Furthermore, since all lenders
are engaged in this monitoring, no one will get
a better place in line than he would if none of
them monitored, so these resources are spent in
vain. This game looks much like the classic pris-
oners’ dilemma, in which the Pareto-superior
outcome with no monitoring is not a Nash
equilibrium. It is argued that an orderly bank-
ruptcy procedure allows lenders to avoid these
costs, making all of them better off.
A second argument against FCFS rules is the
classic “common pool” problem. Here, it is
claimed that in their rush to be paid, lenders
might reduce the total liquidation value of the
firm by separating assets that would be more
valuable together.2  An orderly liquidation, on
the other hand, would ensure that the firm’s
assets are put to their most productive uses,
maximizing their value to the creditors. Worse
yet, lenders might actually run too soon and
foreclose on illiquid but otherwise viable firms.
Again, formal bankruptcy rules should help
prevent these inefficient liquidations.
n 1 This can be true even when some lenders insert seniority
covenants into their loan agreements.  Once the first lender removes his
assets from the firm, a later lender’s seniority provision no longer carries
much benefit.  Effectively, under a FCFS rule, lenders can assign seniority
to themselves ex post by being the first to request repayment.
n 2 See Longhofer and Peters (1997).
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Jackson (1986, p.10) summarizes the in-
tuition behind these arguments: “The basic
problem that bankruptcy law is designed to
handle ... is that the system of individual 
creditor remedies may be bad for the creditors
as a group when there are not enough assets
to go around.” 
With these (often implicit) assumptions, mod-
ern studies of bankruptcy rules investigate what
shape formal liquidation rules should take. For
example, many authors have looked at the rela-
tive efficiency of the absolute priority rule
(where the order of repayment is determined 
ex ante by assigning each lender a priority level)
and PPRs.3  Under various assumptions, they all
conclude that these rules are inefficient with
regard to both the liquidation/continuation deci-
sion and the decision to make new investments.
Numerous other studies analyze Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code and show that, in general,
it does not provide efficient investment or liqui-
dation incentives either. None of these studies,
however, examines the relative efficiency of var-
ious bankruptcy rules compared to the natural
default—FCFS rules—a necessary starting place
for bankruptcy analyses.
In addition, most models analyze the effects
of bankruptcy ex post. They begin with a firm
whose existing capital structure cannot meet its
current debt obligations. These models focus
on whether different bankruptcy rules provide
proper incentives so that creditors will foreclose
if and only if the firm is insolvent, and will
extend new credit to the firm for and only for
positive net present value projects. It is certainly
interesting to ask whether bankruptcy rules
provide for decisions that are efficient ex post.
But debt contracts are designed to resolve 
ex ante uncertainty, and their efficiency must
therefore be measured from the viewpoint of
the initial contracting problem. The proper
question, then, is how different bankruptcy
rules affect the social cost of debt contracts 
at the time they are written.
Boyes, Faith, and Wrase (1991) is one of only
a few papers that address both these issues.4  Its
authors compare the ex ante social cost of debt
contracts under PPRs and under FCFS rules,
concluding that the PPR found in Chapter 7 is
more efficient than FCFS rules, since it reduces
the cost of contracting. Their result depends on
their assumption that rushing to liquidate the
firm is costly, whereas formal bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are not. In a FCFS world, lenders must
pay to enter a queue to obtain the firm’s assets.
If they allow a firm to continue despite the fact
that its expected return is negative, they will
avoid these queuing costs some of the time
(when the firm does well). Thus, lenders have
an incentive to allow some firms with negative
net present value to continue.5
The model of Boyes, Faith, and Wrase differs
from this one in several important respects.
First, they assume that a FCFS rule is costlier to
implement than is a PPR.6  More important, in
my model the firm chooses between two differ-
ent investment projects. This choice is the firm’s
private information, creating a moral hazard
problem that requires lenders to monitor the
firm. When there are many lenders, they may
wish to free ride on one another’s monitoring
efforts. I propose that FCFS rules can serve to
ameliorate this problem.
II. The Model
Consider a two-period world in which a risk-
neutral firm has the opportunity to invest in
one of two projects in period 0, either of which
will mature in period 2. The first, project B, has
a random return, paying xh in period 2 with
probability p and xl with probability (1–p). In
contrast, project G is a safe project, returning 
x – = pxh + (1 – p)xl in period 2 with certainty.7
Either project requires an investment of I
to undertake. Because the firm has no resources
of its own, it must borrow these funds from 
outside investors. I assume the loan market is
composed of a large number of identical, risk-
neutral agents. In equilibrium, competition will
always drive down the interest rate, R, to ensure
that all lenders earn zero profits. Assume that x –
is high enough always to enable the firm with
the riskless project to make its promised pay-
ments in period 3. In contrast, I > xl, so that if
the firm chooses project B, it can meet its oblig-
ations only when the project is successful.
When the firm is unable to repay its loans,
default costs of d are incurred.
n 3 See, for example, Bulow and Shoven (1978), White (1980, 1983),
and Gertner and Scharfstein (1991).
n 4 See also Longhofer and Peters (1997).
n 5 The authors also acknowledge that FCFS rules may result in
inefficient liquidations of firms that have a positive net present value and
claim that this further supports their argument that PPRs are more efficient.
They ignore, however, the possibility that these two effects may offset each
other, reducing the net inefficiency of FCFS rules.
n 6 If they were to assume that both types of rules entailed the same
costs, their model would indicate a preference for FCFS rules, which in-
volve these costs only a fraction of the time, rather than PPRs, which
always do.
n 7 More generally, I could assume that G is second-order stochastic
dominant over B.
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Assume that the choice of project is costlessly
observable by the firm. Outsiders, however,
must monitor the firm in period 1 in order to
discover its project choice. Let c denote the cost
of doing so. Although the results of this moni-
toring provide a perfect signal of the firm’s proj-
ect choice, I assume that this information cannot
be verified in court, making it impossible for
contracts to depend on the choice of project.8
To analyze the effects of priority on the effi-
ciency of financial contracting, I assume that
the firm must borrow from multiple lenders.9
For simplicity, assume that the firm borrows I/2
from each of two lenders. Figure 1 shows the
order of events in this economy.
Long-term Debt
To finance either of these projects, the firm
could issue long-term debt—that is, debt that
comes due in period 2. On the basis of their
beliefs about the firm’s project choice, prospec-
tive lenders will demand a default premium
commensurate with that project’s anticipated
risk. If they believe the firm will choose to in-
vest in the riskless project G, each lender will
simply charge the zero-profit interest rate, 
RG * = I/2. On the other hand, if they anticipate
the firm will choose project B, each lender’s
expected return is 
(1) pR + (1 – p) – ,
implying a zero-profit interest rate, 
RB * = [I – (1 – p)(xl – d )]/2p; it is straightfor-
ward to verify that RB* > RG *.
Of course, the firm is concerned about the
interest rate it pays only to the extent that its
profits are affected. Given any promised pay-
ment, R, the firm’s period-2 profit from project
G is x – – 2R with certainty. In contrast, its profit
from project B is p(xh – 2R). Because there are
deadweight costs associated with default, it is
certain that, if both projects were priced com-
petitively, the firm would earn a higher ex-
pected return from project G. Nevertheless, it is
easy to show:
PROPOSITION 1. Given any fixed promised re-
payment R, the firm will
always choose to invest in
project B.
This proposition implies that long-term debt
prevents the firm from credibly promising to
invest in the riskless project in equilibrium.
Once it receives the (relatively low) interest rate
associated with project G, it would like to go
ahead and invest in B, since it suffers none of
the losses associated with the project’s increased
variability. If long-term debt is the only option,
no lender will accept any interest rate below
RB*, and the firm will invest in project B.
This inability to commit to the riskless project
obviously entails social costs. Because lenders
earn zero profits in equilibrium, these costs can
be measured by comparing the profits the firm
would have earned had it been able to commit
to project G with those it earns from project B.
This ends up equaling the expected deadweight
default costs associated with project B: d(1 – p).
Short-term Debt
Is it possible to avoid such costs? One solution
to this moral hazard problem is a maturity mis-
match with short-term debt.10  Suppose the firm
must make a payment to its lenders in period 1.
Since it has no revenues until period 2, it must
either default or convince the lenders to roll
over its debt. Before renewing the debt, how-
ever, lenders can monitor the firm and deter-
mine which project has been selected.
If lenders could credibly commit to monitor-
ing the firm in period 1, short-term debt would
give the firm an incentive to invest in project G.
n 8 If contracts could depend on the specific contract chosen, the
first–best outcome would occur, in which the firm always chooses project G.
n 9 I do not formally motivate this assumption here. See Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1996) for a formal model motivating the use of multiple
creditors.
n 10 It would be formally identical if we continued to consider long-
term contracts with covenants that allow lenders to demand repayment in
period 1.  Note, however, that such covenants would not explicitly depend
on the choice of project, since we have assumed this choice is not verifiable
in court.








Economic Review 1997 Q125
I assume, however, that such commitment is not
possible. As a result, once project G is chosen,
lenders no longer have any incentive to monitor
the firm. Of course, the firm can anticipate that
this will happen, and will once again choose
project B. Thus, the pure-strategy equilibrium is
the same with short- and long-term debt con-
tracts; the firm chooses project B, while lenders
charge RB* and never monitor the firm.
Thus, to find an equilibrium in which the
firm invests in the riskless project, we must
focus on mixed strategies, in which the firm
chooses each of the projects with some posi-
tive probability, and lenders randomly monitor
this choice.
After financing is provided in period zero,
the firm must decide how often it will invest in
each of the two projects, and the bank must
decide how often it will monitor. Let p Î (0,1)
be the probability that the firm selects project
B, and a Î (0,1) be the probability that each
lender monitors the firm in period 1. Since I
am looking for a symmetric equilibrium, the
total probability that the firm is monitored is 
1 – (1 – a)2.11  Finally, let R denote the face
value of the debt owed to each lender, so that
the firm’s total debt is 2R.
Conditional on the results of its monitoring
in period 1, each lender must decide whether
to roll over its debt or to demand immediate
repayment of its loan. Assume that the firm has
no cash assets in period 1, so that it must be
liquidated whenever either lender demands
repayment, and that all debt contracts contain
cross-default clauses, stipulating that the loan is
in default whenever another creditor demands
early repayment of its debt. Let z be the post-
bankruptcy-cost, period-1 liquidation value 
of the firm. I assume that z < I/2, so that this 
value is insufficient to pay off either of the
firm’s creditors. Lenders who monitor the firm
are first in line for its assets when it is liqui-
dated in period 1, since they are the first to be
aware that the firm has cheated. Thus, under 
a FCFS rule, the firm’s assets, z, are distributed
only to lenders who actually monitor the firm;
since z < I/2, nothing remains for a nonmoni-
toring lender. In contrast, under the PPR, 
each lender receives z/2 when the firm is 
liquidated in period 1, whether it monitored
the firm or not.
Finally, if the firm is not liquidated in 
period 1, its project matures and revenues are
received in period 3. If the firm’s project is suc-
cessful, it pays off its lenders and keeps the bal-
ance of its revenues as profit; otherwise, it is
liquidated and its assets (xl – d) are divided
equally between the two creditors. 
Derivation of 
an Equilibrium
Since we are looking for a symmetric, mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium, a and p must be
chosen so as to make the firm and the lenders,
respectively, willing to randomize. That is, each
lender’s probability of monitoring, a, must be
such that the firm earns the same expected
return regardless of which project it chooses:
(2) x – – 2R = (1 – a)2 p (xh – 2R)
or
(3) a* = 1 –
Direct differentiation of  a* shows that it is
increasing in R. In other words, the firm’s moral
hazard problem worsens as R gets larger, im-
plying that more monitoring is required to keep
it indifferent between the two projects when
the interest rate is high.  
Similarly, p must be chosen to ensure that
lenders are indifferent between monitoring and
not monitoring the firm. The competitive loan
market imposes the additional constraint that
each lender must earn zero expected profit. It
follows that p* and R* must be jointly chosen
to solve
(4) (1 – p)R + p3 a z
2




(5) (1 – p)R




where l1and l2 are a lender’s payoffs from
early liquidation when it is the only one to
monitor and when it does not monitor, respec-
tively. These two payoffs depend on the bank-
ruptcy rules in effect. 
The intuition behind each of these expres-
sions is clear. Equation (4) is a lender’s expected
return when it monitors the firm. If it discovers
that the firm selected the riskless project (which
happens with probability 1 – p), it allows the
firm to continue until period 2 and receives its
Ï
x – – 2R
p(xh – 2R)
2
n 11 I focus on a symmetric equilibrium because of its analytical
tractability.  The same basic conclusions would follow from a model in
which one lender was designated to monitor more frequently than the other.
.
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promised payment R at that time. On the other
hand, if it finds that the firm chose project B, it
demands immediate repayment.12  If the other
lender also monitored (which happens with
probability a), the two lenders divide z equally.
On the other hand, if the other lender did not
monitor the firm, then the monitoring lender’s
payoff is l1 and depends on the bankruptcy
rule in effect. Under FCFS rules, the sole moni-
tor is entitled to all of the firm’s liquidation
value, while these assets are divided equally
under a PPR. Thus, l1
FCFS = z, and l1
PPR = z/2.
Finally, note that the lender’s total costs in this
case include the monitoring expenses it incurs,
c, and its original investment in the firm, I/2.
A similar intuition is behind equation (5), 
the lender’s expected return when it does 
not monitor. With probability 1 – p, the firm
chooses the riskless project, and the lender
earns R with certainty. With probability p, the
firm chooses project B. With probability a, 
the other lender monitors the firm and
demands immediate repayment. In this last
case, the nonmonitoring lender receives l2,
where l2
FCFS = 0 and l2
PPR = z/2. On the other
hand, if neither lender monitors the firm, its
project is allowed to mature. With probability p,
the project succeeds, paying each lender R.
With probability 1 – p, it fails, and the two
lenders split xl – d between them. Finally, since
no monitoring costs are incurred in this case,
the interest rate must simply recoup the firm’s
investment, I/2.
Given this setup, we have the characteriza-
tion of equilibrium in 




a) The firm chooses project B with prob-
ability p* and project G with probability 
1 –  p*;
b) Each lender chooses to monitor the firm
with probability a*and refuses to renew
its loan only after observing the firm has
chosen project B; and
c) Lenders never liquidate the firm in pe-
riod 1 when they do not monitor.
Proposition 2 tells us that short-term debt
may be one device for mitigating the firm’s
incentive to invest in the risky project, B, and
that it holds regardless of which bankruptcy
rules are in effect. The possibility that it might
be monitored and liquidated by one of its
lenders gives the firm an incentive to invest in
the safe project with some positive probability.
Since the deadweight costs of default associated
with project B are incurred less often, the firm’s




In the last section, I showed how short-term
debt with monitoring can be used to lessen a
firm’s moral hazard problem, improving the ef-
ficiency of financial contracting. In this section, I
focus on how the institutional structure used to
divide the assets of a financially distressed firm
can affect the efficiency of these contracts.
The equilibrium derived in the last section
was equally consistent with FCFS rules and
PPRs. My goal in this section is to show that this
mixed-strategy equilibrium is less likely to exist
under PPRs, and that when it does exist, the
total social cost of the contract will be higher
with PPRs. I do this by examining the interest
rate in the problem under each of these rules.
For a mixed-strategy equilibrium to exist, R*
and p* must jointly solve (4) and (5). In addi-
tion, the following conditions must be satisfied:
a* Î (0,1), p* Î (0,1), and R* £ x –/2.13
Because I have assumed that the loan mar-
ket is perfectly competitive, it is straightforward
to measure the relative efficiency of bankruptcy
rules by calculating the difference between the
firm’s expected profits under each of them. Be-
cause a* is chosen to make the firm indifferent
between the two projects, the firm’s expected
profit is simply equal to
(6) x – – 2R.
Expression (6) makes it clear that the pre-
ferred bankruptcy rule will be the one that min-
imizes the total face value of the firm’s debt. 
I am now able to prove the primary result of
this paper:
PROPOSITION  3. The total face value of the
firm’s debt is lowest under the
FCFS rule, meaning that
social welfare is highest
under this bankruptcy rule.
n 12 This is simply assumed in the formulation of expression (4) and
is formally proven in proposition 2.
n 13 If this final condition is violated in any candidate equilibrium,
the firm will have no incentive to choose the riskless project (p* = 1),
giving the lender no incentive to monitor the firm.  As the previous section
showed, this degenerates to the (inefficient) long-term debt solution.
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Proposition 3 is illustrated in figure 2. Let p1
be the locus of (p, R) pairs that solve (4), and
p2 the locus solving (5). The leftmost intersec-
tion of these loci is the equilibrium.14
When the firm is caught investing in project
B, a FCFS rule gives more to lenders who moni-
tor than does a PPR. Thus, p1
FCFS  is everywhere
above p1
PPR. Similarly, when the firm is caught
cheating, lenders who monitor have a higher
expected return under a PPR than under a FCFS
rule. Hence, p2
FCFS is everywhere below p2
PPR.
Together, these two facts imply that the first
intersection of the two curves under a PPR must
be to the right of their first intersection under a
FCFS rule. Consequently, the equilibrium under
a FCFS rule must entail a lower interest rate.
Proposition 3 affirms that, contrary to the
generally accepted view, a bankruptcy institu-
tion in which lenders may run on a firm in
default to collect their assets can actually be
socially preferred to an institution prohibiting
such runs. Essentially, PPRs encourage lenders
to free ride on the monitoring efforts of others,
since these rules give each lender—whether it
monitors or not—the same claim on the firm’s
assets. With FCFS rules, lenders have more in-
centive to monitor because they get first call on
the defaulting firm’s assets. This reduces the in-
terest rate needed to give lenders zero expect-
ed profits, letting the firm earn a higher return.
Proposition 3 has an immediate corollary: 
PROPOSITION 4. A mixed-strategy equilibrium
is less likely to exist under a
PPR than under a FCFS rule.
Proposition 4 implies that equilibrium under
PPRs is more likely to degenerate to the pure-
strategy, long-term debt equilibrium in which
the firm always invests in project B. To under-
stand this proposition, note that the largest 
value that R can take in any mixed-strategy
equilibrium is x –/2; for any larger R, the firm
would never choose to invest in project G,
since doing so would provide it with a negative
return. Basically, the shifts in p1 and p2 result-
ing from a move to a PPR make it less likely
that the intersection between these two curves
will occur within this relevant range.
To summarize, FCFS rules can be beneficial
for two reasons. First, socially desirable debt
contracts are more likely to be feasible under
FCFS rules than when PPRs govern default.
Second, the total cost of this debt is lower
under FCFS rules, increasing the firm’s ex ante
expected profit. In short, allowing lenders to
run on the firm can be beneficial because it
improves lenders’ monitoring incentives by
compensating them when, and only when, they
perform this socially desirable activity.
IV. Concluding
Thoughts
This paper questions the standard assumption
that preventing lenders from running on a firm
is always necessary in bankruptcy. In the
model presented here, a moral hazard problem
makes the act of monitoring a socially benefi-
cial public good. As a result, the total cost of
debt contracting is reduced when the bank-
ruptcy procedure compensates those lenders
who monitor a misbehaving firm. Allowing
creditors to run on a financially distressed firm
to retrieve their assets serves to implement just
such a compensation mechanism.
Lately, there has been extensive debate
about whether bankruptcy laws should be
reformed, and if so, how. One proposal receiv-
ing significant attention is by Aghion, Hart, and
Moore (1992).15  They suggest that each of a
F I G U R E 2
Advantage of FCFS Rules
SOURCE: Author.
n 14 Since any such intersection provides lenders with zero expected
profit, the leftmost intersection results in the lowest possible interest rate
for the borrower, making it the equilibrium.
n 15 See also Roe (1983) and Bebchuk (1988).
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firm’s creditors should be given an option to
purchase the firm’s assets from more senior
claimants at the value of their claims. This sys-
tem would guarantee that a distressed firm’s
assets end up with the individual or group that
values them most, and would ensure that eco-
nomically viable firms will continue. While
this proposal would do much to eliminate the
ex post inefficiencies associated with modern
bankruptcy proceedings, it does not resolve
the basic concerns addressed in this paper.
Like the PPR I discuss above, their proposal
does not consider the impact a proper com-
pensation scheme can have on the probability
that bankruptcy will occur in the first place. 
The main point of this model with respect 
to the debate over bankruptcy reform is that
policymakers should consider the impact of
bankruptcy rules not only on the distribution of
a financially distressed firm’s assets, but also on
the terms of debt contracts. It is this latter influ-
ence that has the largest effect on social welfare. 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Holding the interest
rate constant, the difference between the
firm’s profit from project B and project G is 
(1 – p)(2R – xl). In any equilibrium, 2R ³ I > xl,
showing that this difference must be positive. n
Proof of Proposition 2. R* and p* are defined
in the text so as to ensure that lenders are will-
ing to randomize, and a* is defined to ensure
that the firm is willing to randomize. Thus, it re-
mains to be shown only that 1) lenders will
liquidate the firm after monitoring and observ-
ing project B; 2) lenders will not liquidate after
monitoring and observing project G; and 
3) lenders will not liquidate the firm in period 1
when they do not monitor.
1) Upon observing project G, the lender’s
expected return from liquidating the firm is z/2
under a PPR. Thus, for a lender to be willing to






+ 1 – a)3pR + (1 – p) xl – d
2 4







which must hold since c is positive. An analo-
gous argument shows that the lender will
always want to liquidate the risky firm under
FCFS rules.
2) The lender’s expected return from allow-
ing the riskless project to mature is R* > I/2 > z,
verifying that lenders will not force early liqui-
dation in this case.
3) The most a lender can hope to earn from
liquidating a firm that it does not monitor is z,
which is (by assumption) less than I/2, the
expected return from allowing this firm’s proj-
ect to mature (by expression [5]). Thus, lenders
will allow the firm’s project to mature in this
case as well. n
Proof of Proposition 3. Solving (4) and (5) for p
as functions of R gives us
(8) p1(R) = R  – az/2 – (1 – a)l1
and
(9) p2(R) =
R – al2 – (1 – a)[pR + (1 – p)(x1 –d)/2] 
.
The intersection of these two functions in
the positive orthant gives the (p, R) pairs that
simultaneously solve (4) and (5). If these curves
intersect more than once, the first such intersec-
tion is the candidate for equilibrium, since it
entails the lowest interest rate. 
Now, p1(R) = 0 when R = I/2 + c, and 
p2(R) = 0 when R = I/2. As R gets larger, each
of these must move into the positive orthant,
since p is a convex weight. As noted in the
text, l1 is smaller under a PPR than under a
FCFS rule. Thus, p1
PPR  minorizes p1
FCFS.16  Simi-
larly, l2 is larger under a PPR than under a
FCFS rule, implying that p2
FCFS  minorizes p2
PPR.
This implies that the first intersection of p1
PPR
and p2
PPR must lie to the right of the first inter-
section of p1
FCFS  and p2
FCFS  (see figure 2). Com-
pared to a FCFS rule, then, a PPR must entail a
higher interest rate. n
p
R  – c – I/2
R  – I/2
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